Abstract.Crépeau constructed a quantum 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer (OT) in 1994 based on the transmission of polarized light and the existence of the secure quantum bit commitment (QBC) protocol [3] . However, Mayers [12], Lo and Chau [10] claimed the impossibility of the quantum bit commitment in 1996. In 1997, Lo showed that quantum oblivious transfer couldn't be achieved with the same reason [11] . These results imply severe setback for quantum cryptography. In the 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer, Lo claimed that to prevent a dishonest Alice from learning anything, the reduced density matrices in Alice's hand for two cases must be the same. This requirement is too strong. In this paper, we find that to prevent a dishonest Alice from leaning anything, the qubits that Alice receives is encoded by different bases, Alice can learn nothing from them, just like the eavesdropper in the scheme BB84, cannot distinguish the photos encoded in two different bases [4] . We construct a unconditionally secure quantum oblivious transfer using the secure property of quantum key distribution (QKD) [4] . It bypasses Lo's attack. Furthermore, m-out-of-n quantum oblivious transfer, a more general oblivious transfer, is constructed. Finally, We show that quantum bit commitment can be constructed using QOT.
Introduction

Background
Quantum cryptography is one example of applying a deep understanding of quantum physics to create a novel technology of potentially enormous significance. Quantum cryptography currently has two important aspects, both mostly theoretical. The first is quantum key exchange [4, 5] , the second is the effect of quantum computation on cryptanalysis [19] .
Oblivious Transfer (OT) is a key component in many applications of cryptography. OT was first put forward by Rabin [18] . In 1985, Even, Goldreich and Lempel provided another similar cryptographic tool named 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer [7] using any public key cryptosystem.
In 1989, Bellare and Micali showed how to implement 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer without interaction [16] , through the medium of a public file.
Informally speaking in an oblivious Transfer, Alice sends a bit to Bob that he receives half the time (this fact is out of their control), Alice does not find out what happened, Bob knows if he get the bit or nothing. Similarly, in a 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer, Alice has two bits b 0 , b 1 that she sends to Bob in such a way that he can decide to get either of them at his choosing but not both. Alice cannot find out which bit Bob received.
A more general oblivious transfer is 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer. In the scheme, Bob can get only one from the n bits sent from Alice. In 1996, Brassard, Crépeau and Santha showed that 1-out-of-n oblivious transfers could be constructed by intersecting codes [8] . In 1999, Naor and Pinkas provided a 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer with adaptive queries [13] .
m-out-of-n (1 ≤ m < n) oblivious transfer is the most general one. m-out-of-n oblivious transfer can be constructed by 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer m time [13] . However, it can be constructed more efficiently. In, 2002, Mu, Zhang, and Varadharajan showed that m-out-of-n oblivious transfer can be constructed based on discrete logarithm [21] .
In 1994, Claude Crépeau provided a quantum 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer [3] (QOT) based on the transmission of polarized light and the existence of secure quantum bit commitment protocol [1] . He proved that if both of the two parties follow the protocol, then Bob can get the one and only one bit except with a negligible number ε n .
Unfortunately secure quantum bit commitment is claimed to be impossible by Mayers [12] , and also by Lo and Chau [10] . In 1997, Lo extended the impossibility to one-side two-party computations, so he had the corollary that quantum oblivious transfer are impossible [11] . These results have been widely reported in the scientific press. However, we will show that all of the impossibility they discussed were based on a strong precondition. We will give a example that there exist a unconditionally secure quantum oblivious transfer, which leads to the possibility of the unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment.
Results and Organization
In section 2, we give the definitions of the secure requirements of the quantum oblivious transfer.
In section 3, we construct a quantum 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer, prove that the QOT we construct is confined by the 3 requirements of definition. In section 4, we show why our scheme can bypass Lo's attack. In section 5, quantum m-out-of-n oblivious transfer is constructed. In section 6, an application is gave, which show that quantum bit commitment can be constructed based on the QOT. Finally, we give the conclusion and show some further works for research.
Definition
In this section, we formally describe the definitions of 1-out-of-2 oblivious and m-out-of-n oblivious transfer. In the definition, the correctness means that if Alice is honest, Bob can always get the bit b c . The privacy for Bob means that if Bob is honest, Alice cannot find out c, i.e. she can guess that c = 0 or c = 1 is with probability 
Definition 2.2 m-out-of-n Oblivious Transfer (OT
We say that OT m n is m-out-of-n oblivious-transfer if
• Privacy for Bob :
• Privacy for Alice :
In the definition, the correctness means that if Alice is honest, Bob can always get the 1 2 In this section, we present a QOT 1 2 scheme, prove it is confined to the 3 requirement of the definition.
QOT
Intuition of the QOT
2
Some of the preliminaries of this subsection can also be found in [9] . The QOT 1 2 makes use of some interesting properties of the Bell states. It relies on the Bell states:
and the four unitary matrices
If Bob wants to know b 0 , he builds one of the following 3-qubits state (randomly selects one)
and if Bob wants to know b 1 , he builds one of the following 3-qubits state (randomly selects one)
Bob sends |ϕ 1 to Alice. When Alice gets the qubits, she applies
and the 3rd qubits. It is easy to verify:
That is, Alice will applies a phase flip if b 0 = 1 and a bit flip if b 1 = 1.
So if Bob wants to know b 0 , the qubits become
and if Bob wants to know b 1 , the qubits become
When Alice measures the third qubit, there are 4 different cases.
1. If Bob's choice c = 0 and the result be |0 , the remnant qubits |ϕ 3 would be
2. if Bob's choice c = 0 and the result be |1 , the remnant qubits |ϕ 3 would be
3. If Bob's choice c = 1 and the result be |0 , the remnant qubits |ϕ 3 would be
4. If Bob's choice c = 1 and the result be |1 , the remnant qubits |ϕ 3 would be
From the four cases, we find that if c=0, the remnant 2-qubits is in entanglement state.
If Alice measures the second qubit, the remnant qubit would be |0 or |1 , the remnant qubit doesn't have any relation to b 0 and b 1 . To avoid this, Alice applies the Hadamard transformation to the second qubit , which map
Alice applies the Hadamard transformation to the first qubit, which maps
Alice measures the first qubit. Whether Alice applies the Hadamard transformation to the 1st qubits and 2nd qubits before measuring the 3rd qubit or Alice applies the Hadamard transformation after the measurement, Bob always gets the same result. In our scheme, Alice applies the Hadamard transformation to the 1st and 2nd qubits, measures the 3 qubits together. Alice announces the measurement result to Bob so that Bob can get |b c according to the following 8 tables.
Finally, we require that Bob should send two same |ϕ 1 to Alice at the beginning. The reason will be explained later.
QOT 1 2
We present the QOT 1 2 in the following. 3. Alice selects a random c A ∈ {0, 1};
Alice sets
to the 2nd and the 3rd qubits; 
Analysis
Correctness
From the above subsections, we can easy have the conclusion that if Alice is honest and Bob follows the scheme, he will get b c . i.e. (|0 |B 00 + |1 |B 01 ) , (|0 |B 00 + |1 |B 01 ) (|0 |B 00 − |1 |B 01 ) (|0 |B 10 + |1 |B 11 ) (|0 |B 00 + |1 |B 10 ) (|0 |B 00 + |1 |B 10 ) (|0 |B 00 − |1 |B 10 ) 
Privacy for Bob
Let's consider the 2nd and the 3nd qubits of |ϕ 1 . If Bob's choice c = 0, the measurement results of the 2nd and the 3rd qubits would be the same as measuring the following 2-qubits:
If Bob's choice c = 1, the measurement results of the 2nd and the 3rd qubits would be the same as measuring the following 2-qubits:
It easy to check that
We can consider the two groups qubits as two bases, Base0 (when c = 0) and Base1 (when c=1). If c = 0, Alice measures the 2nd and the 3rd qubits with Base1, she gets 
We can look Base0 and Base1 as
So, we have the follow corollary: 
Privacy for Alice
If 
Alice applies Hadamard transformation H ⊗ H to the 1st and 2nd qubits of |ϕ 2 , gets
If Bob sends only one |ϕ 1 to Alice.
From |ϕ 3 ,we find that if Alice measure the 3-qubits in her hand. The qubits in Bob's hand is
For example, if Bob sets
|ϕ 000 = |00 , |ϕ 001 = |01 , |ϕ 010 = |10 , |ϕ 011 = |11 .
and Alice measures the 3-qubits to be |000 , the remnant qubits in Bob's hand is
Bob can measure the 2 qubits with the base (|00 + |01 + |10 + |11 , |00 + |01 − |10 − |11 , |00 −|01 +|10 −|11 , |00 −|01 −|10 +|11 ) so that he can get both b 0 and b 1 with probability 1. He can get b 0 and b 1 with probability 1 when Alice measure the 3-qubits with other results.
If Bob sends two same |ϕ 1 s to Alice.
However, in our scheme, Bob must send two |ϕ 1 to Alice. The two 3-qubits Alice received must be the same, otherwise, Bob cannot get either b 0 or b 1 from Alice's announce.
Alice selects only one of them to apply to Alice. After the operations of Alice, the qubits in Bob's hand would be |ϕ 4 = p 000 |ϕ 000 ± p 001 |ϕ 001 (−1)
Bob cannot get any additional information from the qubits in his hand, except that he have the ability to guess Alice's choice c A .
If Bob construct the qubits in the following way 4 Why the Attack on the QOT Fail
Attack by Lo
We only consider Lo's attack to QOT, and show why our scheme can bypass this attack. In 
Why We Can Bypass the Attack
From the above section we find that the requirement (b) will result in the conclusion that the qubits on Alice's side cannot be distinguished. In [11] , Lo showed that an ideal protocol should prevent such a dishonest Alice from learning anything about c. He claimed that the reduced density matrices in Alice's hand for the two cases must be the same. It is too strong to realize the requirement (b).
In our scheme, we make using of the unconditionally secure of the quantum key distribution, unconditionally secure can be achieved by one of the parties cannot distinguished two bases.
The qubits that Bob sends to Alice is selected from one of the two bases Base0 and Base1. If
Bob select Base0, he can get b 0 , otherwise, he can get b 1 . However, Alice can not distinguish whether the qubits she received is from Base0 or Base1. This is why the scheme in our paper can bypass the attack of the QOT.
QOT n m
We first construct QOT 1 n using QOT 1 2 , and construct QOT m n using QOT 1 n . In QOT 1 n , Alice has n bits b 1 , b 2 , · · · , b n ∈ {0, 1}. Bob has choice c ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}. The QOT 1 n scheme in the following.
1. Alice constructs n random bits r 1 , r 2 , · · · , r n ∈ {0, 1};
2. Bob select c 1 , c 2 , · · · , c n ∈ {0, 1} decided by c;
3.
Alice and Bob run
If both Bob and Alice is honest, Bob can get b c with probability 1.
We show that Bob cannot get more than one bit. From the scheme we constructed, we find 
Application
In this section, we construct a QBC scheme using QOT 1 2 . In [12, 10] , Mayers, Lo and Chau claimed that Alice from learning anything about the qubits will lead to conclusion, the reduced density matrices in her hand for the two cases must be the same, it is too strong. The scheme consists of two sub protocols, Commit and U nveil: • (Binding) If Bob tries to change his mind about the value of b, then Alice will reject with probability ε n .
• (Sealing) If Alice attempts to learn information about the deposited bit b, the probability she can get it is 
